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TWO NOTES ON EVIDENCE:
PRIVILEGES AND HEARSAY
Hon. J. W. Deese /
A. PRIVILEGES
I. Introduction
Evidentiary rules of privilege differ from other
rules of evidence or rules of admissibility in two important
ways: (1) at some administrative tribunals, such as those
under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act and some
State Administrative Procedure Acts, the rules of evidence
applicable in courts of general jurisdiction are not requir-
ed to be applied; but even in these tribunals the rules of
privilege still apply. (2) Unlike other rules of admissi-
bility, which either determine the relevance of evidence or
impose conditions of admissibility directed to improving the
quality of proof and rejecting evidence which is either
untrustworthy or unreliable; rules of privilege exist, not
to enhance the search for the truth, but instead to forbid
the admission of evidence because some consideration extrin-
sic to the search for the truth is regarded as more impor-
tant. Each privilege to be discussed serves a purpose
totally outside the search for the truth in the legal
proceeding. While the rules of evidence are used to get the
most trustworthy information possible, the rules of privi-
lege seek to protect extrajudicial public policy interests.
The Federal Rules of Evidence, enacted by
Congress, are worth considering, not only because of their
use in Federal tribunals, but also because a number of
states have adopted either the Federal rules, or their own
rules very similar to the Federal rules. The United States
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Supreme Court proposed to the Congress the adoption of nine
specific privileges. However, Congress declined to adopt
the rule as proposed, and instead adopted a general rule:
FRE501-General Rule: "Except as otherwise requir-
ed by the Constitution of the United States or provided by
Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursu-
ant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, per-
son, government, State, or political subdivision thereof,
shall be governed by the principles of the Common Law as
they may be interpreted by the Courts of the United States
in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil
actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a
claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of
decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government,
State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined
in accordance with State law."
The Commission on Uniform State Laws has, in
recommending evidence laws to the states, followed the
format proposed by the Supreme Court, with several changes:
the required reports privilege was omitted, the extension of
the attorney-client privilege to a representative of the
client (corporate employee) was omitted, the psycho-
therapist-patient privilege was expanded to include all
physicians, the spousal privilege was expanded to include
privilege for confidential marital communications, and the
governmental secret privileges were "compressed". Most of
the state evidence codes had followed the listed privileges
format rather than the broad Common Law approach found in
the Federal Rules of Evidence.
PROPOSED TO COMMISSION ON RECOGNIZED BY
CONGRESS UNIFORM STATE STATES
LAWS
Trade Secrets Protected but not
privileged
Psychotherapist- Does not always
patient include
psychologist
No Added physician- Physician-patient
patient privilege (some include
nurses and den-
tists)
PROPOSED TO
CONGRESS
COMMISSION ON
UNIFORM STATE
LAWS
RECOGNIZED BY
STATES
Clergyman-penitent
Husband-wife
Attorney (& rep.)-
client
Secrets of State
No
Identity of infor-
mer
Political Vote
Required reports
Not mentioned
Not absolute disqua-
lification
Confidential Marital
Communications
Rep. of client delet-
ed (Upjohn)
(only if working with
attorney)
Reduced
Not as such
Rejected--unnecessary
Confidential
Marital Communi-
cations
Yes
Accountant-client
Yes
Work product
Generally allowed,
particularly in
search warrant
applications
No
Journalist
II. Constitutional Privileges
The best known evidentiary privilege contained in
the United States Constitution is the privilege against
self-incrimination. U.S. Const. Amd. V. This "fifth
amendment" privilege, guaranteed by the United States
Constitution in all tribunals whether bound by the rules of
evidence or not, whether administrative or not, consists of
two separable privileges: (1) the right of a criminal
accused, including parolee in parole revocation proceedings,
to refuse to be sworn and to testify at all, and (2) the
right of any witness to refuse to answer a particular
Varies
question, the answer to which may tend to incriminate the
witness.
The first privilege, that of a criminal accused
not to testify, extends beyond a regular criminal prosecu-
tion, all probation and parole revocation proceedings, and
prison inmate disciplinary matters; to include ancillary
civil or administrative proceedings, including license
revocations, personnel matters, and even unemployment
insurance, where criminal charges have been placed against a
person, or are clearly expected to be placed against such
person. If an owner of this privilege testifies, it must
appear on the record that such testimony was voluntary and
that the owner of the privilege was aware of the privilege
not to testify. If an owner of this privilege declines to
testify, no mention may be made of the silence of the
accused, and, in this situation, no adverse inference may be
drawn from the election by the accused to exercise his con-
stitutionally guaranteed right. The second "fifth amend-
ment" privilege, the right of any witness to refuse to
answer an incriminating question, extends to any witness,
whether that person has been or is believed to be about to
be accused of any criminal act, but only extends to ques-
tions that call for an answer which would expose the witness
to criminal liability. Where no criminal liability can be
suspected before the asking of the question, there is no
requirement that the witness be informed on the record of
this privilege. However, any witness may consult its own
counsel as to potential criminal liability regarding any
question, and may claim this privilege. If the witness
answers the question, voluntarily, without claiming the pri-
vilege, the privilege is waived. The Judge, in order to de-
cide whether the privilege applies to a particular question,
may require in camera disclosure of the information, which
would not be placed in the record, and then rule upon whe-
ther the information would be incriminating. Under this
privilege, a showing may be required that the information
sought to be withheld actually would expose the witness to
criminal liability, as opposed to civil liability or disqua-
lification for a claimed benefit.
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion provides "no person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself". This pro-
vision absolutely protects the owner of the privilege
against all legal compulsion to testify unless there has
been a grant of immunity to the witness. There are two
types of immunity, neither of which can be granted by an
administrative tribunal. The lesser immunity, use immunity,
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provides that the testimony of the witness may not there-
after be used against him in any criminal proceeding, but
prosecution may be had if the criminal act can otherwise be
proven. A broader immunity is transactional immunity, which
bars any prosecution for the event about which testimony is
compelled.
In Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486,
1951, the United States Supreme Court held that this privi-
lege must "be accorded liberal construction in favor of the
right it was intended to secure". Clearly, this privilege
is applicable in every type of legal proceeding, including
all types of administrative proceedings, as well as civil
matters, legislative hearings, governmental investigations,
and any other proceedings. However, the Supreme Court, in
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 48, 1968, limited
this protection to "real and appreciable" dangers, anddenied it to fears that were only "imaginary and unsubstan-
tial". Four years later, in Zicarelli v. Investigation
Commission, 406 U.S. 472, 478, 1972, the court reiterated
this policy, limiting protection to "real dangers, not
remote and speculative possibilities".
Self-incrimination is defined as the production of
evidence which subjects or may subject the witness to crimi-
nal liability in any jurisdiction in which prosecution is
realistically possible, regardless of whether or not crimi-
nal charges are already pending.
Similarly, this privilege is not restricted to a
criminal proceeding, but may be claimed in any proceeding,
if the information sought to be protected would potentially
expose the witness to a criminal or quasi-criminal sanction
in either that or any other proceeding.
This privilege, however, only extends to natural
persons, and does not extend to corporations, partnerships,
labor unions, churches, or other artificial entities.
Generally, public employees enjoy the same fifth
amendment privileges as do private citizens, as to criminal
prosecutions. However, because a higher standard of conduct
is imposed on public employees than upon private citizens,
this protection does not automatically extend to employment
discipline proceedings. The United States Supreme Court, in
Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 1968, and again in
Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 1973, held that public
employees may be required to answer questions which are
directed specifically and narrowly to the performance of
their job, or else suffer loss of employment. See also Book
v. United States Postal Service, 675 F.2d 158. In 1977, the
court held in Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 806,
that public employees may be required to answer even poten-
tially incriminating questions "if they have not been
required to surrender their constitutional immunity".
However, in that case the court restated its earlier holding
in Gardner, supra, that a state may not discharge an
employee merely for refusing to sign a waiver of immunity.
Even when testimony can be compelled in an administrative
proceeding, and such testimony results in dismissal from
employment, such testimony compelled under threat of
discharge was held in Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493,
1967, inadmissible against the (former) employee in a
criminal prosecution. The following year, in Uniformed
Sanitation Men's Assn. v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392
U.S. 280, 1968, the court held that where an employee
refused to testify at the administrative hearing because of
a threat of use of the testimony in a criminal proceeding,
the employee may not be discharged for refusing to testify.
The privilege against self-incrimination may be
claimed in any administrative proceeding, civil or criminal,
in any legislative proceeding, in juvenile proceedings, in
Internal Revenue proceedings and with respect to required
Internal Revenue forms, returns and reports, in registration
and other required reports, in parole revocation and correc-
tional matters, in civil litigation, and in all criminal
matters, including examinations, interrogations, sentencing,
pretrial motions, grand jury proceedings, and of course,
criminal trials.
While this constitutional privilege may be waived,
the waiver is not self-executing. Any doubt about the
waiver must be resolved in favor of the privilege. While
not required outside of a criminal case, the better practice
would be for the Judge to make sure that any witness enti-
tled to this privilege is aware of the privilege. The
United States Supreme Court, in Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742, 1970, held that waiver of the privilege against
self-incrimination must both be voluntary and be "knowing,
intelligent acts, done with sufficient awareness of relevant
circumstances and likely consequences"
The second Constitutional privilege arises from
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
subsequent cases which have held that evidence obtained as a
result of any violation of the prohibition against improper
search and seizure cannot be used substantively against the
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person whose rights have been violated. In a number of
states, this privilege is limited to criminal matters.
However, parole revocation is, for this purpose, a "criminal
matter". In these states, unconstitutionally obtained
evidence may be used in civil or administrative proceedings
that have no relation to criminal justice. Also, unconsti-
tutionally obtained evidence may be used to impeach a person
who has already testified, even when that evidence could not
be used as part of the case in chief against that person.
III. Spousal Privileges
There are two separate spousal or marital privi-
leges. The first of these consists of a spouse's privilege
not to testify against the other spouse; and the second
consists of the privilege of either spouse to prevent the
other spouse from disclosing confidential marital communi-
cations. With both of these privileges the law varies
greatly from one jurisdiction to another, and both privi-
leges are so rapidly changing that a Judge must constantly
review the law of one's own state. The purpose of both of
these privileges is to foster family harmony by avoiding the
intra-family turmoil that would occur when one spouse is
made to testify against another, or when one spouse dis-
closes a confidential communication; and to insure privacy
and open communication between spouses.
The privilege not to testify is recognized in
approximately two-thirds of the states, in one of three
forms: Six states consider a spouse incompetent to testify
against his or her spouse. Some states allow the spouse to
prevent the other from giving adverse testimony, or in a few
of these states any testimony at all. Most states allow the
witness spouse to elect not to testify, or at least to
refuse to testify against the other spouse. In most states
this privilege applies only in criminal cases, but in all of
these states parole revocation would be considered for this
purpose a criminal case. In a few states, it applies in
criminal cases and in those civil cases to which one spouse
is a party (e.g., California Evidence Code Section 970),
however, this privilege does not apply in five types of
cases: 1. spouse against spouse; 2. spouse abuse, child
abuse, or neglect; 3. cases involving injury to the person
or property of a third party, arising from an offense
committed by one spouse against the other spouse; 4. matters
occurring prior to marriage; and 5. bigamy. Under this
privilege, a valid marriage is required, and once
established, encompasses all knowledge of the witness
spouse.
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There is considerable question as to which spouse
is the owner of this privilege. In the Federal courts and
some states, only the witness spouse is the holder, and can
claim it against the adverse party but not the party spouse.
In other states, including California, the witness spouse is
the owner of the privilege, and can claim it against any
adverse party, including the party spouse. In other states,
only the party spouse is the owner. In other states, either
or both spouses is the owner. "When one spouse is willing
to testify against the other in a criminal proceeding--
whatever the motivation--their relationship is almost cer-
tainly in disrepair; there is probably little in the way of
marital harmony for the privilege to preserve. In these
circumstances, a rule of evidence that permits an accused to
prevent adverse spousal testimony seems far more likely to
frustrate justice than to foster family peace . . . Accord-
ingly, we conclude that the existing rules should be modi-
fied so that the witness spouse alone has the privilege to
refuse to testify adversely; the witness may be neither
compelled to testify nor foreclosed from testifying."
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53, 1980.
This privilege can only be claimed during
marriage, not after divorce, and not in the absence of a
valid legal marriage. When claimed, this privilege allows
the witness spouse not to testify at all. It is, therefore,
not required to be claimed on a question-by-question basis.
If claimed, no inference may be drawn from the claim of the
privilege. This privilege may be waived by the owner of the
privilege, and may be impliedly waived, as well as expressly
waived. Implied waiver exists when the holder of the privi-
lege fails to object before the witness spouse commences to
testify about the substance of the case. Unlike self-
incrimination, no admonition by the Judge to a possible
holder of this privilege is necessary.
The marital communications privilege, intended not
only to foster family harmony, but to also insure privacy
and therefore facilitate open communication between spouses
and protect the confidentiality of the marital relationship,
allows a spouse to prevent the other spouse from disclosing
a confidential communication exchanged during the marriage.
This privilege applies in all criminal cases, including
parole revocation, and also largely is applicable in civil
cases. This relationship also requires a valid marriage,
but would also include a voidable marriage that has not been-
annulled. In this situation, there is distinction between
voidable marriage and void marriage. Engagement, cohabita-
tion, or an invalid common-law marriage would not be
sufficient for the privilege to apply. Common-law marriage,
in a state where such is recognized, is a valid marriage.
The key to the applicability of this privilege lies in
whether the information sought to be excluded was a con-
fidential marital communication. The burden of proof on
this question is upon the claimant of the privilege. For a
communication to be privileged, it must have been either a
verbal or nonverbal communication, intended as a communi-
cation at the time. Nonassertive conduct does not qualify.
The communication must have been between spouses, in the
absence of any third party, and must have been intended at
the time to be confidential, and not to be disclosed.
Whether a child of the family constitutes a third person,
taking the communication out from under the privilege, de-
pends upon the age and cognition of the child. In Schmied
v. Frank, 86 Ind. 250, 257, 1882, a statement from one
spouse to another, directing the second spouse to sign a
note at the bank tomorrow, was held not to be a confidential
marital communication. A number of states also include
within this privilege any fact derived from the confidential
communication, the disclosure of which would tend to reveal
the content of the confidential communication. (McCormick
on Evidence § 191.) While the better view is to limit this
privilege to actual communications, a few courts have ex-
tended this privilege to nonassertive acts which occurred in
private. With this privilege also, there are three views as
to who owns the privilege. In California and some other
states, either spouse owns the privilege; in New Mexico and
some other states, the witness spouse owns the privilege;
and in a number of states the original communicator owns theprivilege. As to whether this privilege may be claimed
against eavesdroppers, a growing minority holds that it can.(McCormick, § 196 and 197.) This privilege must be claimed
on a question-by-question basis, and no inference may be
drawn from the claim of the privilege. Only the owner of
the privilege can waive it, which waiver can be implied from
voluntary disclosure of the information or failure to object
when there is adequate opportunity to do so. Implied waiver
does not result if the owner of the privilege has no oppor-
tunity to object or if disclosure has been compelled.
IV. Attorney-Client Privilege
The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to
enhance open and complete communication between attorney and
client by insuring privacy, so that the client is free to
completely disclose all appropriate facts to counsel, whichis necessary in order for counsel to be effective. This
privilege is recognized by all jurisdictions and applies in
all cases, civil, criminal or administrative. The privilege
applies to any consultation with any attorney, licensed or
reasonably believed to be licensed to practice law in any
jurisdiction, if the consultation either consisted or was
for the purpose of rendition or receipt of legal services.
It is immaterial whether a fee was paid, requested, or the
services were gratuitous. However, conversation with an
attorney, as personal friend, business consultant, or some
other non-attorney capacity, do not generally create an
attorney-client relationship. Once created, this relation-
ship continues until terminated by either attorney or
client, or upon the death of either attorney or client, but
communication which occurred during the existence of the
relationship continues to be privileged thereafter. There
are four recognized exceptions to this privilege: 1. cases
between lawyer and client; 2. cases between two or more
clients who jointly consulted the same lawyer; 3. cases
where the client communicates with a lawyer intending to
commit a future crime or fraud; and 4. cases between parties
who claim through the same deceased client. As with most
privileges, the burden of proving the existence of the
relationship rests upon the claimant of the privilege.
This privilege protects written, verbal, or non-
verbal communication by a client or client's representative
to the lawyer or the lawyer's representative, but does not
include non-assertive conduct. As the lawyer's representa-
tive this may include the attorney's staff employee or an
accountant working in conjunction with and for the attorney.
As to the client's representative, states and Federal courts
split. Many states limit the privilege, for corporations,
to the control group of the corporation; that is, represen-
tatives of the corporation who have the authority to seek
out and act upon legal advice for the corporation. However,
the Federal courts and a minority of states follow Upjohn v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 1981, which, more broadly,
allows the privilege whenever the communication relates to
the employee's assigned duties and is treated as confiden-
tial information by the corporation. Where different
attorneys represent different clients on a matter of common
interest, each client and attorney is allowed a privilege as
to his own statements. Obviously, communications between
attorneys representing the same client are privileged. It
must be shown, however, that the communications were when
made not intended to be disclosed. The presence of third
parties, other than attorney or client staff, may destroy
this privilege. The identity of the client is not privi-
leged, nor are, generally, matters regarding attorneys'
fees. The holder of the privilege, the client, may always
claim the privilege, and after the client is dead, the
personal representative may in many states claim the privi-
lege. The attorney may also claim the privilege on behalf
of his client, and may be required to do so. The Judge has
discretion to assert this privilege for the client; but the
opposing party does not. Death of the client does not ter-
minate this privilege. This privilege can be claimed
against the attorney who seeks to divulge information with-
out authorization, and to any third person whose presence
was known. States split, but the trend is toward extending
this privilege to eavesdroppers. The privilege must be
claimed on a question-by-question basis.
V. Accountant-Client Privilege
While no accountant-client privilege existed at
common law, approximately 20 states, Arizona, Colorado,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada,
New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and Vermont; but
not the Federal tribunals, have allowed a privilege for
accountant-client communication, for the same purposes and
for the same reasons that attorney-client communications areprivileged. Colorado, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, and
Michigan have, however, restricted this privilege to commu-
nications with certified public accountants. As with the
attorney-client privilege, two states, Florida and Nevada,
specifically allow the accountant to assert the privilege onbehalf of the client. Not only are oral and written commu-
nications from the client to the accountant privileged, but
all books, accounts, and other financial records supplied by
the client to the accountant are also protected. Communica-
tions made to the accountant by third parties, directly
related to the services the accountant is providing for the
client, are also privileged. The accountant's work papers
and files are privileged under this privilege, and may alsobe privileged in other states under the work product privi-
lege.
VI. Work Product Privilege
The work product privilege serves the purposes of
the protection of the adversarial process itself and the
protection of the right of counsel to prepare the case in
reasonable privacy. It is divisible into two parts: an
absolute privilege, and a qualified privilege. The absolute
privilege, well explained in the last sentence of Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 26(B)(3), protects against
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disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions
and legal theories of an attorney or other representative
(consultant, surety, insurer, accountant, or other agent) of
a party concerning the litigation.
In addition to the absolute privilege for mental
impressions, a qualified privilege extends to all documents
and tangible things prepared for litigation or in anticipa-
tion of litigation. These documents, exhibits, and other
tangibles are privileged and protected from disclosure both
at discovery and at trial except where the party seeking
disclosure demonstrates to the satisfaction of the tribunal
that he "has substantial need of the materials in the
preparation of his case and that he is unable without undue
hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of such mater-
ials by other means". Undue hardship, more often than not,
consists of impossibility, rather than expense, such as in a
case where an automobile involved in a wreck has been exa-
mined, and then destroyed. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,
1947; United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 1975; and
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 1981. This pri-
vilege does not include documents prepared in the regular
course of business (which are not privileged at all), but
includes written statements of a witness, written reports of
an attorney or investigator, or physical objects, prepared
in anticipation of litigation by a party or a representative
of a party. See Burlington Industries v. Exxon Corp., 65
F.R.D. 26, 1974; Virginia Electric Co. v. Sum Shipbuilding
Co.; 68 F.R.D. 397, 1975; Coastal States Gas Corp. v.
Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 1980; A.P.L. Corp. v.
Aetna Ins. Co., 91 F.R.D. 10, 1980; Fine v. Bellafonte Ins.
Co., 91 F.R.D. 420, 1981; Carver v. Allstate Ins. Co., 94
F.R.D. 131, 1982. This privilege may be claimed by either
the party or the lawyer or other representative. Lohman v.
Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 3d 90, 146 Cal. Rptr. 171,
1978. Where this privilege applied, it is waived, however,
when the party calls as a trial witness the person whose
statement is claimed to fall within the work product privi-
lege. At that point, the statement becomes evidence avail-
able for impeachment. Nobles, supra. It is noted that this
privilege has been held to extend beyond the case for which
the materials were prepared. FTC v. Grolier, Inc.,--U.S.--,
51 USLW 4660, June 6, 1983.
VII. Doctor-Patient Privilege
This privilege, unknown at common law, recognized
by most states, but severly limited in Federal tribunals,
applies in the majority of states only to civil actions
(which should include administrative proceedings), but in
some cases applies to both civil and criminal matters,
74 ALR3d 1458. This privilege exists for the purpose of
enabling a patient to communicate freely without fear of
discovery, for the purpose of obtaining needed health care.
Most states allow some exceptions to the privilege,
generally including: cases between doctor and patient,
cases involving child abuse or neglect, cases involving
gunshot wounds or venereal disease, will contests, involun-
tary mental commitment proceedings and cases in which the
patient's communication was in furtherance of a future crime
or fraud. What constitutes a doctor within the meaning of
this privilege, varies from state to state. The present
Federal rule limits this to psychotherapists. Most states
include any licensed physician. Many do not include a
psychologist, but some do. Chiropractors, naturopaths,
optometrists, nurses, and other medical technologists and
therapists other than physicians are often included, the
inclusion varying from one state to the next. 47 ALR2d 742.
As with the attorney-client privilege, what is required is a
communication for the purpose of receiving treatment. As
with attorney-client, it does not matter whether employment
actually occurs, or whether a fee is paid or by whom. It is
required, however, that the communication be intended to be
confidential. The privilege generally dies with the
patient. Communications to a physician employed for the
purpose of examination in connection with litigation, or for
the purpose of qualifying for some benefit (e.g., social
security), cannot be a privileged communication, because
such physician is communicated with for the purpose of
examination and not for the purpose of treatment. As is
usually the case, verbal and nonverbal communications are
included but non-assertive conduct is not considered a com-
munication. Observations, however, of the physician, in a
privileged setting, such as the patient walking through an
empty waiting room, are included. The physician's observa-
tions of the patient's body are included, particularly such
observations as would not be visible to the public at large.
While the presence of third parties may remove a communica-
tion or observation from the confidential realm, neither
nurses or the doctor's staff, nor members of the patient's
family who are assisting the patient with treatment, are
considered third parties for the purpose of removing the
communications or observations from the privilege. The
holder of this privilege is the patient, and it may be
claimed by the patient's personal representative after the
patient's death, for communications occurring during the
patient's lifetime. The doctor may claim the privilege, in
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behalf of the patient, when the patient is not present. The
Judge has discretion to assert this privilege, but the
opposing party has no standing to assert the privilege. As
with other privileges, states split as to whether it may be
asserted against eavesdroppers, whose presence was not
known. The better rule is that it can be. No inference may
be drawn from the claiming of this privilege which generally
must be claimed on a question-by-question basis. It may be
waived by voluntary disclosure, only by the holder of the
privilege. Waiver may be implied when there is a failure to
object to disclosure, with an opportunity to do so.
VIII. Clergyman-Penitent
This privilege exists for the purpose of protect-
ing religious confessions, and therewith, freedom of reli-
gion. This privilege is now recognized by statute in nearly
every state, but the recognition varies, both as to who is
considered a clergyman, and what types of communication are
protected. Generally protected are communications made in
confidence for the purpose of procuring religious advice or
"forgiveness". The penitent "confessor's" own ordained
minister is generally included. Some states extend the
privilege to any ordained minister, whether the penitent's
own minister or not, and Iowa extended the privilege to
elders of a Presbyterian church. On the other hand,
Oklahoma and New Jersey deny the privilege to communications
to a Catholic nun. While some states name specific reli-
gions, the constitutionality of granting the privilege to
members of one faith, and not to members of another faith,
is in grave doubt. This privilege clearly applies in both
civil and criminal matters, as well as administrative pro-
ceedings. The holder of the privilege is the penitent, but
it may be claimed by the penitent, the personal represen-
tative of a deceased penitent, the guardian or conservator
of a juvenile or incompetent penitent, or by the clergyman,
claiming on behalf of the penitent. In some states, this
testimony is simply prohibited, without any claim of the
privilege. Only the penitent may waive the privilege.
Implied waiver may occur when the penitent testifies to the
contents of the communication.
IX. Governmental Privileges and Secrets of State
The purpose of this privilege is to protect the
national defense and international relations of the United
States and to protect from disclosure contrary to the public
interest other official information within the custody of a
governmental entity. The privilege for secrets of state,
which includes classified military information is absolute,
while it has been held that the privilege for other official
information is qualified, and protected where it is shown to
the satisfaction of the tribunal that the public interest
against disclosure outweighs the necessity of disclosure.
In making this determination, the Judge may examine the
information in camera, except that classified military
information is absolutely privileged and a state Judge
(including Administrative Law Judge) must recognize the
classification imposed by the United States Government.
However, if the prosecution imposes this privilege and
refuses to disclose information necessary to the defendant
for his defense, while the disclosure of the information may
not be compellable, an alternative remedy is to dismiss the
charge against the defendant. From the standpoint of the
defendant, this is an adequate remedy. Also, from the
standpoint of the government, it is an adequate remedy in
that the protection and preservation of the official secrets
remain inviolate. As to the identity of a criminal infor-
mant, it has been held in a number of search and seizure
cases, that where the informant has merely provided informa-
tion which constituted probable cause for obtaining a search
warrant, and those facts are not used as evidence in the
prosecution case in chief, but were only used to obtain a
warrant, the execution of which yielded evidence, the in-
formant's identity need not be disclosed. This is a correct
holding because the prosecution's case does not rest upon
the informant's veracity, and nothing the informant has said
is being presented to the ultimate trier of fact. If the
execution of the search warrant yielded evidence that is
being used, it thus appears that the informant's information
proved to be correct. Therefore, the defendant's only use
of the identity of the informant would be to cause harm to
the informant, which would be against the interest of
justice.
X. Trade Secrets
The privilege protecting trade secrets is quali-
fied and limited, and exists for the purpose of protecting
proprietary information from compelled disclosure and there-
fore unjust profiteering by competitors. Whether this pri-
vilege is to be allowed depends upon the nature of the case,
the identity of the party seeking disclosure, and whether
adequate protection may be had simply by sealing the record.
It has been held that trade secrets are not to be privileged
against the public need for disclosure for the protection of
the environment or the protection of public interests. In
such cases, usually the adverse party is the state, and
adequate protection may be had simply by sealing the record,
and closing the courtroom.
XI. Political Vote
While a privilege for political vote was proposed
by the Supreme Court, it was not included in the Federal
Rules of Evidence. However, where a political vote is under
the election laws a secret ballot, states will generally not
compel its disclosure. Sometimes an exception is made where
necessary in the litigation of dishonest vote counting,
ballot box stuffing, and similar election frauds.
XII. Required Reports
A privilege for required reports was submitted to
the Congress by the Supreme Court, but was not adopted, with
the view held by Congress that no such privilege is neces-
sary. Generally, states do not recognize any such privi-
lege.
XIII. Journalist's Sources
Some cases have protected the identity of a
journalist's informant, but most have not. Newsmen have
been jailed for contempt for refusing to identify their
"sources"
B. HEARSAY
I. Introduction
The credibility of a witness is generally based
upon an evaluation of four factors--the witness's: 1. per-
ception, 2. memory, 3. truthfulness, 4. clarity of narra-
tion. Before the Judge or jury must determine credibility,
the opposing party may test that credibility by cross exami-
nation. The objection to the admission of hearsay arises
from the absence of the speaker whose credibility must be
determined in order to weigh the evidence presented. The
out-of-court witness is not available for cross examination.
Hearsay is: a statement (oral, written, or
assertive conduct) made out of court and offered to prove
the truth of the contents of the statement. Testimony about
an act which when committed was not intended to be a commu-
nication is not hearsay and is not excluded under this rule.
Testimony about a statement made out of court, when not
offered to prove the truth of the contents of that
